UN security council needs major changes – permanent seats for African countries is just one

Recently, the US ambassador to the United Nations announced America’s support for the creation of two new permanent UN security council seats for African states. Gary Wilson, a scholar of international law and relations at Liverpool John Moores University Law School – specifically issues related to the United Nations – argues that although Africa’s time may have come, there are still hurdles to overcome.

What’s wrong with the way the UN Security Council is currently constructed?

One of the most damning criticisms continuously levelled at the United Nations Security Council concerns its perceived lack of legitimacy. Its composition is increasingly seen as unrepresentative of the international community.

In particular, the identity of the privileged veto-wielding permanent members is frequently seen as at odds with modern global political realities.

The UK and France in particular are widely regarded as having undergone a decline in their global status. Their permanent membership is seen as a relic of having been among the victorious allied powers at the end of the second world war. Since that time, other states have emerged as global powers.

Japan and Germany are often touted as leading candidates for UN permanent membership on account of their economic status. But regional powers have emerged in the world’s under-represented regions who can also lay a claim to permanent membership.

The UN security council’s ten non-permanent members are elected in accordance with a formula which ensures they represent the world’s different regions. Three seats are reserved for African states, but only for two-year terms. There is no sustained, coherent African voice.

A further criticism of the council is that it has been inconsistent or even partial in its response to international crises.

African states have long felt neglected by the body’s leading powers. The legacy of its weak response to the Rwandan genocide, for example, continues to cast a shadow over its legitimacy in Africa’s eyes.

What reforms would be in order?

Membership reform has been on the agenda since the UN’s early years. The non-permanent members were expanded from six to ten in 1963.

Pressure for change gathered momentum with the establishment of the Working Group on Security Council Reform in the early 1990s. It has generated a series of reports, but there’s been no change.

Broad consensus exists upon the need for reform, but not on the shape that should take.

It is widely acknowledged that the size of the council will need to grow. Most see it having 22 to 25 member states.

There are some different views about the balance between permanent and non-permanent members. But it’s widely accepted that there ought to be new permanent seats for states from Africa, South America and Asia, as well as Germany and Japan.

Other proposals present greater difficulty. For instance, the abolition or reform of the power of veto seems unlikely given the need for the current permanent members to approve this change.

It is conceivable that any newly created permanent members won’t get the power of veto. So there would be two tiers of permanent membership.

Suggestions for new categories of seats, for example, which would rotate among states within a region or be held by regional organisations, are also problematic. There is currently no legal mechanism within the UN Charter framework for this to happen.

Where do two permanent seats for Africa fit into this picture?

Although Africa is not the only continent with no permanent members on the security council, it is a striking case. Conflict within Africa occupies a disproportionate amount of the council’s time.

A mere glance over the past decade or so will reveal regular appearances on its agenda of Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all current locations of deployed UN peacekeeping operations.

African states are also playing an increasingly important role in supporting the international peace and security agenda.

Over half of the biggest 20 contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, for example, are African states. The African Union has undertaken a number of peace operations of its own, too, sometimes with the UN.

The diversity of the African continent makes the case for two seats more persuasive. There is a risk that a sole African permanent member may fail to represent more than one strand of the continent’s demographic makeup.

What are the hurdles in the process of determining which African countries should occupy two permanent seats?

Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt have all been touted as potential aspiring permanent members.

Resolving such competing claims is tied to questions about what qualifies a state for permanent membership.

Given the UN security council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the qualifications expected of states standing for election as non-permanent members, it seems reasonable to assess states’ ability to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Even these criteria generate different outcomes dependent upon how they are interpreted. How is a state’s contribution to international peace and security quantified? By reference to defence expenditure, participation in UN peace operations, or something else? Many of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, for example, are not typically seen as likely permanent members. This includes the likes of Ethiopia and Rwanda.

Representation is also a problematic concept. Nigeria and Egypt, for example, have the largest and third-largest populations on the African continent; South Africa falls a few places lower down on this criterion. But does a state’s population size make it representative of its continent?

Africa is hardly a homogeneous region and each potential permanent member only represents a particular demographic.

What do you think the future holds for the security council?

The council has undergone some divisive experiences in recent years. This is borne out by a recent resurgence in the exercise of the veto power over situations such as the Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Hamas conflicts.

Expanding the permanent membership does not resolve such issues in itself, but may foster a more general re-balancing and more consistency in its approaches in those situations where the veto threat is not in play.

Although there is wide support for the creation of African permanent seats, this cannot be treated in isolation. It must be considered as part of a wider reform package, including:

• permanent seats for other regions

• the size of the council

• expansion of the non-permanent membership

• new categories of membership.

It is unlikely that one single reform would be made on its own while other issues were left on pause.

This article was originally published in The Conversation.